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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, several newspapers and media sources reported that an Italian 
apparel company had registered the word “Jesus” as a trademark in the United 
States for clothing and other goods, and was wielding its trademark as a weapon 
against other companies that were seeking rights to use the name of Jesus with 
their wares.1  For instance, among other actions, the company filed oppositions 
to prevent trademark registrations for Jesus First, Sweet Jesus, JesusUp and 
Jesus Couture, which in each instance was enough for the applicants to give up 
without a fight.2 One company, though, with an application for Jesus Surfed, 
initially decided to hold its ground by challenging the opposition and calling 
for the cancellation of the JESUS mark due to disparagement.3 This article 
argues that the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) made the correct call 
regarding disparagement in this instance. However, the agency was wrong to 
grant one company the power to exercise excessive control through trademarks 
over use of the word “Jesus” on products, such as t-shirts, that are often used to 
portray an owner’s personality, preferences or emotions (hereinafter called 
“expressive products”).4  The article also explains that the PTO has been too 
quick to sanction other phrases that include “Jesus” within them, and should 
 
1. See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, If You Take These Jeans’ Name in Vain, Prepare to Meet Their 
Maker, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 25, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732443
2004578302060560501092.; Billie Hollowell, What are ‘Jesus Jeans” and Why Are They Sparking 
Legal Battles in (and Over) Christ’s Name?, THE BLAZE, (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.theblaze.com
/stories/2013/02/25/what-are-jesus-jeans-and-why-are-they-sparking-legal-battles-in-and-over-
christs-name/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2014). 
2. Information on these selected oppositions can be found on the Patent and Trademark Office 
website (www.uspto.gov) by searching for the respective trademark application serial numbers: Jesus 
First (SerialSee, JESUS FIRST, Registration No. 76703629; SWEET JESUS, Registration No.  
77628334; JESUS UP, Registration No. 85139476; JESUS COUTURE, Registration No. 77709224. 
3. Michael J. Anton filed an intent-to-use application for “Jesus Surfed” on bandanas, hats, 
sweatshirts and t-shirts on May 30, 2012. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85638044 (filed May 
30, 2012).  The PTO published the application for opposition on October 30, 2012, and Jesus Jeans 
S.R.L. (the current owner of the JESUS trademark) filed an opposition on February 20, 2013. Jesus 
Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton, No. 91209383 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2013).  On April 1, 2013, Anton filed an 
answer to the opposition and a counterclaim requesting that the PTO cancel the registration for JESUS. 
Id. The parties jointly filed a motion to stay proceedings on November 6, 2013 on the grounds that 
they had entered settlement negotiations. Id. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (hereinafter 
“T.T.A.B.”) granted the motion to stay proceedings on December 2, 2013. Id.  On February 8, 2014, 
the parties submitted a stipulation with the T.T.A.B., indicating that Anton had agreed to withdraw his 
trademark application for Jesus Surfed. Id. Accordingly, as part of the settlement, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. 
also dismissed its opposition and Anton dismissed its counterclaims to that opposition. Id.  
Subsequently, on July 7, 2014, Anton filed a new application for Jesus Surfed for “online retail services 
featuring religious and themed apparel.” U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86329975 (filed Jul. 
7, 2014). 
4. Besides t-shirts, examples of expressive products include baseball caps, mugs, bumper 
stickers, and refrigerator magnets, among others. 
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start requiring proof of secondary meaning before registering them as standard 
character marks for expressive products.5 
I. HOW DID ANYONE BESIDES JESUS GET A REGISTRATION FOR 
JESUS? 
The PTO has been registering trademarks that include the word “Jesus” 
since the 1960’s for all kinds of merchandise, including expressive products, 
which are the focus here.6  A quick trademark search shows that there currently 
are over 500 live applications or registrations for such marks.7 The Lanham Act 
actually prevents registration of matter that may “falsely suggest a connection 
with persons, living or dead.”8 This provision is primarily intended to align 
federal registration principles with publicity and sponsorship rights.9  Although 
 
5. A standard character mark provides protection to the words, letters or numbers without 
regard to how they might be displayed, such as with specific fonts, colors, arrangements or additional 
design elements.  Stylized (or design) marks, on the other hand, cover a representation of the characters 
in a specified format. See Representation of the Mark, US PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/mark.jsp (last modified December 14, 2011). For this reason, 
stylized design marks may be immediately distinctive, due to the unique design, even when the 
included characters do not adequately serve identification functions by themselves. See, e.g., In re 
Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. 175 (T.T.A.B. 1976). For a thorough discussion of registration 
principles for stylized marks, see In re Sadoru Group, Ltd., 105 U.S.P.Q.2d 1484 (T.T.A.B. 2012). 
Thus, although this article argues that companies need to demonstrate secondary meaning before 
obtaining registration for Jesus-related trademarks on expressive products, they still could get 
immediate protection for distinctive stylized or design marks, as long as the standard characters are 
disclaimed in the application from coverage. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§1213 (5th ed. Sept. 2007) [hereinafter TMEP]. 
6. The first registered mark incorporating the word Jesus that is listed on the PTO website was 
REORGANIZED CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS. REORGANIZED 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, Registration. No. 0808988.  As of 
August 19, 2014, the PTO had received 1773 applications for marks referencing Jesus. This 
Information was determined by using the Trademark Electronic Search System (“TESS”) on the PTO’s 
website at http://www.uspto.gov. 
7. As of August 19, 2014, TESS indicated 586 live applications and registrations referencing 
the word, Jesus. Id. 
8. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
9. State laws protect publicity rights under the common law or governing statutes.  The basic 
purpose of publicity rights is to protect the economic interests that famous individuals create through 
their personal achievements.  See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 
(1977); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
953 (1980). Thus, the right is intended to prevent members of the public from obtaining unjust 
enrichment by appropriating the commercial value of a person’s identity. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 581 
n.2.  Similarly, the Lanham Act prevents the use of any name that is likely to cause confusion as to the 
sponsorship of goods or services. Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).  The bar on 
registering recognizable names logically prevents an individual from staking a claim to a trademark 
when use of that mark would interfere with someone else’s publicity or sponsorship rights. See, Lee 
B. Burgunder, Opportunistic Trademarking of Slogans: It’s No Clown Issue, Bro, 31 Cardozo Arts & 
Ent. L. J. 769, 784–85. 
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the PTO, in theory, might have attempted to use this clause to prevent 
registration for all uses of the term “Jesus,” it has chosen to not do this, 
presumably because few people would believe that Jesus or his heirs have 
endorsed the products bearing his name.10 For the same reasons, the PTO has 
allowed registrations for the names of other historically famous figures, such 
as MADONNA,11 DA VINCI,12 REMBRANDT,13 and BEETHOVEN.14 
The PTO considers several factors when it reviews trademark applications, 
including those for Jesus-related marks. First, it considers if the word “Jesus,” 
by itself or with other terms, is generic for the product in question. As an 
analogy, the agency would not register the single word “shirt,” for a shirt 
because the term is generic for the product.  The rationale for the denial is that 
a generic word cannot be a distinctive indicator of source.15  Rather, consumers 
will understand it as the name of the product class.16  Additionally, allowing 
one company to obtain exclusive rights to a generic term would be 
economically unfair to competitors since they would have to overcome the 
barrier of informing customers that they sell equivalent products.17  
Trademarks, after all, are only intended to streamline the search process for 
consumers without providing inherent competitive advantages.18  Thus, the 
PTO might take issue with an application for “Jesus” if it were to serve as a 
 
10. Cf. Comedy III Prod. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001) (stating that 
the right of publicity is invoked when the appropriation of a celebrity’s likeness creates a misleading 
impression that the celebrity is endorsing a product). Michael Anton alleged in his counterclaim to 
Jesus Jeans S.R.L.’s opposition that the JESUS mark should be cancelled because it falsely suggests a 
connection with the teachings of Jesus Christ and Christianity. Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton, No. 
91209383 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2013).  This argument misconstrues the purpose of the statutory limitation, 
and it is not discussed further in this article. 
11. E.g., MADONNA, Registration No. 3545635 (for wine); MADONNA, Registration No. 
1473554 (for entertainment services). 
12. E.g., DA VINCI, Registration No. 3989906 (vaporizers); DA VINCI, Registration No. 
85191249 (for film and photograph editing software and hardware). 
13. E.g., REMBRANDT, Registration No. 2806648 (for cheese); REMBRANDT, Registration 
No. 71210631 (for artists’ colors). 
14. E.g., BEETHOVEN, Registration No. 3905515 (for pesticides); BEETHOVEN, 
Registration No. 85292575 (for jewelry). 
15. E.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (A 
generic term refers to the genus of which a particular product is a species). 
16. E.g., Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark Protection of Live Animals: The Bleat Goes On, 10 J. 
MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L., 715, 721 (2011). 
17. E.g., Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10 (stating that protection of generic terms “must be denied 
since this in effect would confer a monopoly not only of the mark, but of the product by rendering a 
competitor unable effectively to name what it was endeavoring to sell.”); W. T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. 
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (claiming that trademark protection for a generic word would 
impair competition by allowing the trademark holder to monopolize a scarce input). 
18. See, e.g., Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark Protection of Smells: Sense or Nonsense, 29 AM. 
BUS. L. J. 459, 465 (1991). 
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trademark for, let say, a baby Jesus doll. However, the PTO assumes that 
“Jesus” is not the generic term for the usual array of expressive products, and 
therefore doesn’t raise the issue in the application process.19 
The PTO also does not immediately register descriptive terms because 
customers at first understand them as descriptions of the products rather than 
as designators of source.20 Thus, it would initially refuse registration of the term 
“Wrinkle-Free-Tee” for a no-iron t-shirt because, when first used, it primarily 
describes the product.  In addition, registration might disadvantage some 
competitors since there is a limited supply of equally effective descriptive 
terms.21  Over time though, due to factors like exclusive use and advertising, 
customers might begin to understand that “Wrinkle-Free-Tee” represents a 
particular source of no-iron t-shirts.22  In this way, it has acquired an additional 
meaning beyond the description, which is as a designator of product source.23  
In this event, the word is said to have attained “secondary meaning” and thereby 
satisfies the appropriate function of a trademark.24  Under these circumstances, 
customers might become confused if other companies were then permitted to 
use the term because it now has source-designating qualities.25  Although 
registration would provide a company with exclusive rights to one of the few 
good ways to describe the product, the dangers from source confusion outweigh 
the potential negative effects on competitors, which still would have several 
other descriptive terms at their disposal.26  Thus, the PTO will register 
descriptive terms, but only after the applicant proves secondary meaning.27  
 
19. This article will later argue that the single word, Jesus, should be treated as a generic or 
common descriptive term for Jesus-related merchandise, such as shirts that express statements about 
Jesus, thus providing one reason the agency was wrong to register Jesus S.R.L.’s trademark so broadly. 
See infra notes 168–70, and accompanying text. 
20. E.g., Lee B. Burgunder, The Scoop on Betty Boop: A Proposal to Limit Overreaching 
Trademarks, 32 Loy. L.A. ENT.  L. REV. 257, 271 (2012). The Lanham Act prevents the registration 
of marks that are merely descriptive of the applicant’s goods. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e) (2006). 
21. See, Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985); William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
290 (1987). 
22. E.g., G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Sallfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912), cert. denied, 243 
U.S. 651 (1917). 
23. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (stating that the 
phrase “acquired meaning” might be more appropriate than “secondary meaning”, which is the 
conventional terminology). 
24. See, e.g., id.; Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (stating 
that secondary meaning develops when “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a 
product feature or term is to identify the source of a product rather than the product itself.”). 
25. E.g., Burgunder, supra note 20, at 272. 
26. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 13–14 (2d Cir. 
1976) 
27. The Lanham Act provides that merely descriptive terms may be registered when the mark 
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Regarding the word “Jesus,” the PTO again apparently takes the position that 
the term does not describe the qualities of a shirt or mug and so does not 
consider descriptiveness to be a barrier to registration.28 
Although use of the term “Jesus” may not be generic for, or descriptive of 
typical expressive products, applicants also must prove that their use is 
distinctive from previous trademark registrations or uses of the term.29 Since 
the PTO has approved dozens of registrations for phrases using the word Jesus 
on expressive products, a major hurdle for an applicant is convincing examiners 
that consumers would perceive the proposed use of “Jesus” as distinctive from 
existing uses of the name. In this regard, the sheer number of uses has worked 
to the advantage of applicants, since consumers are forced by such 
pervasiveness to primarily rely on elements besides the word Jesus to 
distinguish similar products in the marketplace.30 For this reason, the PTO 
might be willing to register both JESUSROCKS and JESUSRULES for similar 
products, despite the common uses of the word “Jesus,” because consumers 
will tend to ignore that overlap and focus instead on the other words to 
distinguish source.31 
This background leads to a surprising story about how a firm registered 
JESUS in the United States for numerous kinds of clothing, including pants and 
 
has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). The Act 
provides that the PTO may accept as proof of secondary meaning that the mark has been used 
exclusively and continuously by the applicant for five years. Id. 
28. The author in his investigation of trademark registrations for phrases involving Jesus on 
expressive products could not find an instance in which the PTO denied registration because the word 
was descriptive or the applicant had not demonstrated secondary meaning. For instance, the applicant 
requesting registration for Jesus Surfed filed the application on May 30, 2012, and the PTO approved 
the phrase for registration just five months later without any inquiry into descriptiveness or secondary 
meaning. JESUS SURFED, Registration No. 85638044. Similarly, the application for Jesus Up was 
filed on September 28, 2010 and the PTO approved the mark for publication in about five months 
without raising any questions about the capacity of the phrase to designate source. JESUS UP, 
Registration No. 85139476. 
29. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006). 
30. TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii) (Third-party registrations may be relevant to show that the mark or 
a portion of the mark is descriptive, suggestive, or so commonly used that the public will look to other 
elements to distinguish the source of the goods or services); TMEP §1207(b)(iii) (Additions to marks 
may be sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if the matter common to the marks is not likely to 
be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source because it is merely descriptive or diluted). 
31. See In re Hamilton Bank, 222 U.S.P.Q. 174 (T.T.A.B., 1984) (stating that the reason that 
so many marks incorporating “KEY” have been registered for financial products is because the 
remaining portions of the various marks are sufficient to distinguish between the marks.).  When 
separate marks both include the same weak or generic word, courts do not totally ignore the shared 
word when conducting a likelihood of confusion evaluation because the common usage may contribute 
to the marks’ similarity along with other factors, such as similarities in sound and meaning. E.g., AMF 
Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351–52 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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t-shirts.32  An Italian business that sold Jesus Jeans obtained a community 
trademark registration in the European Union for the sole word “Jesus” as 
applied to a wide spectrum of merchandise, although the applications were 
rejected in several countries, including Britain.33 In 1999, the firm applied to 
obtain trademark rights in the United States based on the European 
registration.34 The advantage of this process is that the foreign company did not 
have to demonstrate use in the U.S. to receive the initial registration, as long as 
it complied with all the other requirements, such as proving distinctiveness.35  
The PTO at first denied the registration due to the likelihood of confusion with 
several other previous registrations of marks that include the word “Jesus” for 
similar kinds of products.36  However, the company ultimately convinced the 
PTO that the use of “Jesus” was so pervasive and diluted that it should 
essentially be ignored when comparing uses for similarities and potential 
confusion.37  It claimed that its ownership of “Jesus” would be a “satisfactory 
addition to the already robust field of Jesus marks already peacefully coexisting 
in the clothing field.”38 After reviewing this argument, the PTO approved the 
registration in 2007.39 It was not until 2012, when the company had to 
demonstrate use of the mark in the United States, that the PTO first saw a 
specimen, which showed use of the word “Jesus” on Jesus Jeans.40 By that time, 
the original applicant had assigned the trademark to Jesus Jeans S.R.L. 
 
32. Information about the history of the JESUS mark can be found on the PTO website at 
www.uspto.gov. JESUS, Registration No. 3232057. The PTO first registered the mark in 2007 for an 
extremely large range of apparel, but the list of products was reduced in 2012 according to a section 8 
Declaration. The registration now applies to jackets, vests, shirts, t-shirts, pants, shorts, skirts and belts. 
The registration also claims the trademark as a typed drawing, which is the format used to specify a 
standard character mark in applications filed prior to November 2, 2003. See TMEP § 807.03(i). 
33. Foreign Reg. No. 0618251 (Benelux Trademark Office, Dec. 15, 1997). An article in the 
Wall Street Journal stated that the application for JESUS was denied in Britain, although the country 
is a member of the European Union, because the registration is morally offensive to the public. 
Gershman, supra note 1. That article also indicates that applications have also been rejected in Norway, 
Switzerland, Australia, and China, among other countries. Id. 
34. The original U.S. application was filed on December 7, 1999 based on section 44E of the 
Lanham Act. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2006). 
35. Under section 44E, a mark can be registered in the U.S., if otherwise eligible, based on a 
certified copy of a registration in a foreign country. Id. 
36. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 75866210 (filed Dec. 7, 1999). 
37. Basic Trademark S.A., Supplemental Response to Office Action, Serial No. 75866210 (Aug. 
13, 2004). 
38. Id. at 2. 
39. The PTO published the mark for opposition on September 27, 2005 and registered the mark 
based on the foreign registration on April 24, 2007. Supra note 36. 
40. A trademark registrant must file a declaration during the fifth year after registration that the 
mark is in use in U.S. commerce and must submit a specimen showing current use. Lanham Act,15 
U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2006). The specimen was a screen shot of the company’s web page, showing, among 
other items, use of the JESUS mark on jeans. 
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The PTO’s decision to register the sole word “Jesus” as a trademark based 
on the dilution argument was an error that the agency probably now regrets. As 
just noted, several companies may use marks that include the same weak 
elements without creating a likelihood of confusion because consumers will 
rely on the other attributes to make the necessary distinctions in the 
marketplace.  This is the reason, for example, that the PTO has registered 
PEPSI-COLA41 and COCA-COLA,42 despite the overall similarities created by 
the overlapping uses of cola. Of course, in this instance, a company could not 
register the word “cola” by itself, because the word is generic for soda.  
However, other times, the shared word may not be considered generic, but 
rather simply weak because it is often used, or closely associated, with 
particular products.43  The question, then, is whether it might be acceptable to 
allow a registration in these circumstances for the common weak term alone. 
There is at least one precedent in which the PTO did this, when it allowed 
a company to register the word “plus”for vitamins, food supplements, and pet 
products.44  Despite this registration, the PTO has registered numerous other 
marks in the same fields that include “plus,” on the grounds that the combined 
terms make a different commercial impression than the singular word.45 The 
expectation, of course, was that the owner of the PLUS trademark would not 
challenge any use that included other elements besides the word “plus.”46  
 
41. PEPSI-COLA, Registration No. 0824151. 
42. E.g., COCA-COLA, Registration No. 1752201. 
43. See, e.g., Plus Products v. Redken Labs., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 111 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (stating 
that “plus” is a dictionary word that is highly suggestive of something better, and that purchasers, upon 
encountering the word, would attribute to the term its ordinary dictionary meaning); In re Hamilton 
Bank, 222 U.S.P.Q. 174, 177 (T.T.A.B., 1984) (stating that “key” is a weak element in marks for 
financial industry participants because it is suggestive of the prominence and control that customers 
seek.). 
44. PLUS, Registration No. 183787. In another instance, the PTO examiner refused to allow a 
company to register the sole word “KEY” for financial services because numerous other companies 
already had registrations for marks that combined the word “key” with other words, such as BANKEY, 
BLUE KEY, KEYLINE, KEYPHONE and GOLDEN KEY PASS-BOOK ACCOUNT. On appeal, 
the T.T.A.B. determined that confusion was not likely and ordered that the mark be registered.  In re 
Hamilton Bank, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 177. This situation raised other issues, though, because the registration 
for KEY included design elements that in some instances helped differentiate the overall impression 
of the mark from the standard character uses made by other companies. To view the design of the 
trademark, see KEY, Registration No. 1293199. 
45. In an opposition proceeding brought in 1978 by the registrant of PLUS against an applicant 
for “pH PLUS,” the applicant cited thirty-nine third-party registrations for PLUS. Plus Products, 199 
U.S.P.Q. 111. 
46. The applicant for pH PLUS argued that the registrant for PLUS, by virtue of its actions and 
admissions to obtain registration, should be estopped from maintaining that the term “plus” by itself 
should prevent another company from registering a mark in which the word “plus” is only part of a 
composite mark. Id. 
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Reality, however, does not always conform to theory, since the owner of the 
PLUS trademark subsequently opposed registrations for terms such as “pH 
plus”47 and “meaty plus.”48 Although these challenges failed, they do indicate 
the power that the owner of the root word has to potentially scare off others 
who are perfectly entitled to use the terms.  In addition, registration of the 
diluted term can lead to thorny problems when competitors display their 
combination trademarks, which include that protected term in ways that 
highlight the shared component.  For instance, the trademark owner of MEATY 
PLUS might designate its dog food bags with something like “meaty PLUS.” 
Does the company in this way create confusion with the trademark owner of 
PLUS, despite the fact that it owns a registration to use the phrase as it did?49 
The question is whether it really is worth registering the diluted root 
element when so many predictable problems are likely to arise.50 These issues, 
of course, become magnified when the marks involve expressive goods, 
because no longer are we simply talking about rights to identification symbols 
on products. Rather, the owner of a mark, such as JESUS, may challenge other 
companies from expressing their views about the subject in particular ways on 
their products.51  The subsequent history of the JESUS trademark not only 
proves the point, but also demonstrates that the PTO has mishandled other 
considerations when it registers Jesus-related marks. 
A. Jesus® Creates Doubts about Other Trademarks for Jesus 
In 2001, a U.S. individual filed a trademark application for the mark Jesus 
Jeans to be used with clothing such as jeans, t-shirts, sweatshirts and caps.52  
The PTO initially refused the registration due to the similarity of the phrase 
with other protected marks and applications, such as the one that claimed 
JESUS for clothing.53 The applicant ultimately convinced the examiner that 
 
47. Id. at 112. 
48. Plus Products v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 541 (T.T.A.B. 1983). 
49. In the context of JESUS, a company with a standard character trademark for, let’s say, 
JESUSDUDS, might emphasize attention to the Jesus component of the mark, raising the plausible 
argument that a consumer might be confused, thinking that the phrase indicated clothing from the Jesus 
brand. 
50. Words that are used often by multiple firms to designate the same particular features or 
qualities should be treated as no stronger than descriptive marks, and may in fact have become generic 
for a service having the identified attribute.  See infra notes 168–171, and accompanying text. For this 
reason, the PTO should at least require proof of secondary meaning, if it allows registration of these 
terms at all. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1976). 
51. See infra notes 147-150, 157-165, and accompanying text. 
52. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76305357(Aug. 27, 2001). 
53. Trademark App. Serial No. 76305357, PTO Office Actions, (Oct. 31, 2001), (July 3, 2003), 
(June 28, 2007). 
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registration was warranted, due again to the dilution argument.54  It also stated 
that its mark produces a very different commercial impression than previous 
uses of “Jesus” on jeans.55  For instance, it claimed that “Jesus Jeans” is a 
tongue-in-cheek play on words, while the JESUS mark suggests a devout and 
religious marketing approach.56 Based on these arguments, the PTO registered 
JESUS JEANS as a standard character trademark for the selected expressive 
products in 2008.57 
The potential repercussions from these two registrations border on the 
ridiculous.  For instance, one company can sell Jesus-brand jeans in the United 
States with rights to display Jesus® Jeans, while another company is able to 
offer “Jesus Jeans”-brand jeans with rights to Jesus Jeans®.58 Also, ironically, 
in its early years, Jesus® Jeans products were marketed in Italy with edgy 
advertising campaigns, such as one for skimpy shorts using the slogan, “He 
who loves me follows me.”59  Obviously, this is in stark contrast to the Jesus 
Jeans® claim that the Jesus-brand was based on a devout and religious 
approach.  Finally, and perhaps most nefariously, Jesus Jeans S.R.L., the owner 
of the Jesus brand, has filed complaints and oppositions against other 
companies, which have dared to use the word “Jesus” to allegedly indicate 
source on their products.60  To think, this company argued that it had rights to 
JESUS because it could peacefully coexist with all the other “Jesus” users, and 
then it turned around and tried to prevent others from using the name. 
As noted, though, many small companies simply abandoned their 
trademark applications for Jesus-related trademarks after Jesus Jeans S.R.L. 
filed oppositions, presumably because they assumed they would lose or the 
expenses became too great.  In one instance, Jeffrey Lamont, who applied to 
register the phrase Jesus Up for clothing agreed to abandon his application on 
the condition that Jesus Jeans S.R.L. would allow him to use the phrase in a 
 
54. Trademark App. Serial No. 76305357, Applicant’s Response to Office Action (Aug. 31, 
2007) at 8. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. JESUS JEANS, Registration No. 3379848. The mark is registered in the typed drawing 
format, which is the equivalent designation for a standard character mark in applications filed before 
November 2, 2003. See TMEP § 807.03(i). 
58. The owner of the JESUS JEANS trademark filed the section eight affidavit on February 7, 
2014 showing continued use of the mark, just days before the required filing deadline (February 12, 
2014) to avoid abandonment of the registration. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2006). 
59. Gershman, supra note 1. 
60. According to a brief filed by Jesus Jeans S.R.L. opposing the registration of Jesus Surfed, 
the company had successfully opposed the registration of at least sixteen marks for Class 25 (clothing) 
that included the word, Jesus. Notice of Opposition, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton at 2–3, (T.T.A.B. Feb. 
20, 2013) available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=1. 
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“descriptive religious free speech sense.”61  As we shall see, this is something 
that Lamont already was entitled to do, despite the registration of JESUS and 
so Lamont essentially bargained for some assurance that he would not be 
sued.62  If nothing else, the settlement demonstrates the power that the 
registered JESUS mark has to chill legitimate and constitutionally protected 
uses by small businesspersons who cannot afford potential litigation 
expenses.63  These events also illustrate the unfair competitive advantage that 
Jesus Jeans S.R.L. is able to exercise by virtue of owning the root word that is 
necessary for other companies to market products expressing feelings for Jesus.  
As already noted with regard to generic marks, this is a strong signal that the 
registration provides the company undue power via the trademark system. 
In 2013, a company finally had the strength to attempt a more aggressive 
stance against Jesus Jeans S.R.L.’s intimidating tactics.64  In May 2012, 
Michael Anton filed an intent-to-use application to register Jesus Surfed as a 
standard character mark for bandanas, hats, sweatshirts and t-shirts, and the 
PTO quickly approved the application and published it in October for 
opposition. As it had admittedly done at least sixteen times before, Jesus Jeans 
S.R.L. opposed the registration, due to likelihood of confusion with its 
registration of JESUS for articles of clothing.65 This time, though, the applicant 
answered the opposition, arguing, for one, that Jesus Jeans S.R.L.’s registration 
for JESUS should be cancelled because the company had used the mark in a 
manner disparaging to Jesus and Christians.66  This argument came at a timely 
moment, given the amount of attention recently given to the propriety of a 
franchised professional football team controlling trademark rights to 
REDSKINS, which offends many Native Americans.67  Although there is 
 
61. Consented to Amendment of Application and Consented to Dismissal of Opposition, Jesus 
Jeans S.R.L. v. Lamont, Opposition No. 91200725 (T.T.A.B. June 7, 2013) available at http://ttabvue.
uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91200725&pty=OPP&eno=21. 
62. See infra notes 147-150, 172–176, and accompanying text. 
63. See infra notes 157-165, 172–176, and accompanying text. 
64. Answer to Notice of Opposition and Counterclaim to Cancel Opposer’s Reg. No. 3,232,057, 
Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton, Opposition No. 91209383 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2013) available at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=4. 
65. In its opposition, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. stated that it had successfully policed its mark against 
“Jesus Messiah,” “Jesus Image,” “Jesus Pwns,” “Je-Is-Us,” “Jesus Couture,” “Sweet Jesus,” 
“Jesus>Life,” “Jesus Loves Jeans,” “Jesus IQ,” “Jesus Saves,” “Jesus Got It Right,” “Jesus First,” “8 
Up W/Jesus,” “Jesus = ___,” “Jesus Chic” and “Jesus. . .He Gets Me.” It ends the list with “et cetera.” 
Notice of Opposition at 2-3, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton, (T.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2013) available at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=1. 
66. Answer to Notice of Opposition and Counterclaim to Cancel Opposer’s Reg. No. 3,232,057 
at 6, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton, Opposition No. 91209383 (T.T.A.B. April 1, 2013) available at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=4. 
67. See, e.g., Jesse Witten, Taking the Stand: Time to Retire the ‘R’ Reference?, WASHINGTON 
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substantial confusion about the standards that should be applied to demonstrate 
disparagement, and even though many Christians may sympathize with the 
claim, this article will demonstrate that this argument would surely have failed 
if Anton had not ultimately given up the fight after almost a year of litigation.68 
In addition to disparagement, Anton argued that Jesus Jeans S.R.L. should 
have been estopped from opposing the registration, given that the company 
convinced the PTO to grant its registration to JESUS based on the notion of 
dilution. The estoppel argument was undoubtedly compelling. Having allowed 
a registration for JESUS on the grounds that it could peacefully coexist with 
other Jesus-related marks, the PTO should never allow the registration to block 
others who then subsequently attempt to coexist.  As history so clearly 
demonstrates, though, the registration has nonetheless created substantial 
uncertainty under traditional likelihood of confusion principles, which serves 
to illustrate a more fundamental conclusion – that the PTO should have never 
allowed a company the exclusive right to use the word “Jesus” as a trademark 
on expressive products, such as clothing. 
This should not be the end of the story, however, because the PTO also 
erred, as it so often does, when it perfunctorily assumed that Anton’s use of 
Jesus Surfed would serve as a trademark on bandanas and t-shirts.  Thus, in a 
perfect world, the PTO should not only cancel Jesus Jeans S.R.L.’s trademark 
to JESUS, but it should also raise the bar for terms such as “Jesus Surfed” by 
requiring applicants to demonstrate secondary meaning.  Therefore, the 
problems the PTO created by registering the JESUS trademark do not represent 
 
LAWYER, June 2014, at 31; Theresa Vargas, In Rare Unity, Groups Protest Redskins’ Name, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 26, 2013, at B1; Mike DeBonis & Aaron Davis, D.C. Lawmakers Urge Redskins to Change 
Name, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2013 at B1; Theresa Vargas & Annys Shin, Obama: “I’d Think About 
Changing” Redskins Name, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2013 at A1; Ken Belson, Redskins’ Name Change 
Remains Activist’s Unfinished Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2013 at A1. The Redskins trademark 
was subject to a lengthy and highly publicized cancellation proceeding based on disparagement, first 
filed by seven Native Americans in 1992, and which effectively ended in 2008, when the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals barred the claims of even the youngest petitioner on the grounds of laches.  Pro 
Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1025 (2009). In 2006, a 
group of younger Native Americans filed a petition with the T.T.A.B. to cancel the trademark on the 
grounds of disparagement. Petition for Cancellation, Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., (T.T.A.B. Aug. 
11, 2006) available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=92046185&pty=CAN&eno=1. On June 
18, 2014, the T.T.A.B. ruled that the petitioners were not barred by laches, and that six Redskins 
trademark registrations should be cancelled because the term was disparaging to a substantial 
composite of Native Americans at the times the registrations were filed. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, 
Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014). Pro-Football, Inc. filed an appeal in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia on August 14, 2014. See, e.g., Ian Shapira, Redskins Defend Name, Ask 
Federal Court to Overturn Trademark Decision, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2014 at B1. 
68. On February 8, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation of settlement with the T.T.A.B., in which 
Anton agreed to withdraw the trademark application.  The application was abandoned on March 8, 
2014. For more information, see supra note 3. 
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an isolated incidence of a solitary mistake.  Rather, the PTO has more 
fundamentally lost its compass when evaluating Jesus-related trademarks.  The 
intent of this article, therefore, is to help the PTO find its way with “Jesus.” 
II. IS IT OFFENSIVE TO OWN RIGHTS TO JESUS? 
Section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act provides that a mark cannot be 
registered if it “consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous 
matter; or matter which may disparage . . . persons living or dead, institutions, 
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”69  The 
Act also indicates that a mark can be cancelled at any time if the registration 
was obtained contrary to the provisions of section 1052(a).70  Based on these 
conditions, Michael Anton, the applicant for Jesus Surfed, argued that Jesus 
Jeans S.R.L’s trademark for JESUS should be cancelled because its use is 
offensive and disparaging to Jesus Christ, Christianity and Christians.71  To 
substantiate this claim, Anton argued that the public associates the mark with 
Jesus Christ, and that Jesus Jeans S.R.L. has marketed its jeans and continues 
to do so with sexually suggestive advertising that is so irreverent that even the 
Roman Catholic Church has condemned it.72  Although on first blush these 
arguments, if true appear to have merit, they nonetheless are not convincing 
based on current applications of the statute.  This does not mean that all uses of 
“Jesus” in trademarks are fair game; there are situations in which registrations 
could be rejected or cancelled on the grounds that they are scandalous or 
disparaging.73  However, the use made by Jesus Jeans S.R.L., even in light of 
its allegedly sexually offensive advertising, is not one of these cases. 
Many of the problems related to the scandalous and disparagement 
provisions arise because the limitations are not directly related to the main 
purposes of the trademark laws, which are to reduce consumer confusion and 
 
69. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
70. Id. at § 1064(3). 
71. Answer to Notice of Opposition and Counterclaim to Cancel Opposer’s Reg. No. 3,232,057 
at 6, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton, Opposition No. 91209383 (T.T.A.B. April 1, 2013) available at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=4. 
72. Id. The brief notes that the jeans have been advertised with scantily clad women and sexual 
innuendo that violate Jesus Christ’s call for sexual purity.  It also claims that statements in the ads, 
such as “He who love me follows me” and “Thou shalt not have any other jeans but me” are 
sacrilegious attempts at word play. Id. at 3–5. Jesus Jeans S.R.L., among other things, claims that the 
allegedly offensive marketing did not take place in the United States and that its use of the mark is not 
disparaging. Id. at 1–3 
73. For instance, the USPTO recently rejected an application for Porno Jesus on the grounds 
that the mark is scandalous and disparaging to Christians.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
85767380 (filed Oct. 30, 2012). 
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further distributional efficiency.74  The history of these sections leaves an 
unclear trail about the purposes that Congress intended to achieve.75  To some 
observers, Congress included these restrictions to regulate morality by 
dissuading uses of terms and symbols considered to be morally offensive.76  
One court, though, claimed that it did not see the limitations as “an attempt to 
legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by Congress that such marks should 
not occupy the time, services, and use of funds of the federal government.”77  If 
nothing else, the inconclusive rationales for the restrictions open the door for 
any offended group to plausibly argue that a mark should not enjoy the benefits 
of federal protection, as Michael Anton clearly believed with his claim against 
JESUS. 
The prohibitions on registering scandalous and disparaging marks are 
drafted in separate statements and are theoretically appraised as two separate 
grounds for denying protection.  Scandalous marks are words or symbols that 
a substantial composite of the public would find disgraceful, vulgar, offensive, 
disreputable or shocking to the sense of decency.78  A few words are per se 
scandalous, in that they would be inappropriate with any product in every 
circumstance.79  For instance, although there have been, and still are, several 
 
74. E.g., Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-”Fame”-Y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as 
Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 173, 213 (2007). 
75. For a good discussion of the history of these provisions, see id. at 186-213. See also Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp.2d 96, 124 (D.D.C. 2003), remanded, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 
415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that the T.T.A.B. has noted the dearth of legislative history on 
the disparagement provision in section 2(a)”). Denial of registration would not prevent someone from 
using the mark, but that person could not enjoy the benefits of federal registration. See In re McGinley, 
600 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (stating that “[w]ith respect to appellant’s First Amendment rights, 
it is clear that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does not affect his right to use it.”)  In 
addition, it is possible that this person would not be able to rely on federal unfair competition principles 
to prevent others from using confusingly similar marks. See Rebecca Tushnet, Unregistrable Means 
Unprotectable By Sec. 43 As Well, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG, (June 4, 2014), http://tushnet
.blogspot.com/2014/06/unregistrable-means-unprotectable-by.html (discussing Renna v. County of 
Union, NJ, 2014 WL 2435775 (D.N.J. May 29, 2014)); PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, Vol. 3, 127–28 (2007). But see 
Mark McKenna, Guest Post by Prof. McKenna: The Implications of Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 
PATENTLY-O (June 19, 2014) http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/implications-blackhorse-
football.html (arguing that loss of registration under §1052(a) does not terminate federal unfair 
competition rights). 
76. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 75 at 128–29; Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act as 
a Restriction on Sports Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS LAW J. 65, 
67–70 (1997). The language of the statute itself provides strong support for this notion since it 
specifically prevents registration of “immoral matter.” Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
77. McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486. 
78. E.g., In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Riverbank 
Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938). 
79. See e.g., Abdel-Khalik, supra note 74, at 214-18; Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation 
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applications for trademarks including the word “shit,” the PTO has yet to 
register one because use of the term is considered vulgar to a substantial 
composite of the public.80  Clearly, “Jesus” is not a word that, by itself, would 
be viewed as offensive or disgraceful by the general public, so it is not per se 
scandalous.81 
The definitions of many words, though, have both appropriate and vulgar 
meanings, and so the determination of whether marks using those words are 
scandalous will depend on the context of their usage in light of 
contemporaneous attitudes.82 For instance, the word “pussy” has several 
innocuous meanings such as cat or wimp, but also may be interpreted as female 
genitalia.  Therefore, the term may be just fine when applied to animal 
products83 or if included with a design of a cat,84 but may be offensive if used 
suggestively with energy drinks85 or on condoms.86  Similarly, the phrase, “Big 
Pecker,” clearly can have a scandalous sexual meaning, but may simply be 
funny if integrated in a design with a chicken having a big beak.87 Thus, 
hypothetically, it might not be scandalous for a salvage company to use the 
mark “Jesus Junk.” However, one might reach a different conclusion if a penis-
enlargement company, for its trademark, combined the phrase with a picture of 
 
of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law An Appropriate Solution for 
Words that Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 415, 433 (2001). 
80. See In re R.G.S. Group, Ltd., 1997 TTAB LEXIS 293 (T.T.A.B. 1997). 
81. In contrast, a PTO trademark examiner determined in a first office action that the phrase “I 
KILLED JESUS” could not be registered for t-shirts because the phrase is immoral or scandalous. U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78414874 (filed Jan. 7, 2005).  The application was abandoned. 
82. See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d. at 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“In determining whether 
appellant’s mark may be refused registration as scandalous, the mark must be considered in the context 
of the marketplace as applied to only the goods or services described in the application for 
registration.”); Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1371 (stating that the court “must be mindful of ever-changing social 
attitudes and sensitivities.”). 
83. E.g., PUSSY & POOCH PETHOUSE AND PAWBAR,. No. 3643993. (Pussy & Pooch 
Pethouse and Pawbar, for specialty interiors for pets). 
84. E.g., PUSSY, Registration No. 4120676 (Design mark for Pussy including a picture of a 
cat for cosmetics); PUSSY NATURAL ENERGY, Registration No. 4254281 (Pussy Natural Energy 
registered after inclusion of design depicting a cat). 
85. The application to register PUSSY NATURAL ENERGY for energy drinks, was rejected 
by that PTO examiner on the grounds that it was scandalous, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78690531 (filed Aug. 11, 2005), and the decision was affirmed by the T.T.A.B. in In re Sheare (May 
14, 2009). The mark was subsequently registered after the applicant revised the design mark to include 
the picture of a cat. PUSSY NATURAL ENERGY, Registration. No. 4254281. 
86. Hello Pussy, for condoms, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77906546 (filed Jan. 6, 
2010), denial due to inclusion of immoral or scandalous matter (Apr. 9, 2010). 
87. In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (T.T.A.B., 1988). But see In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (finding “cock sucker” along with the design of a rooster scandalous for chocolate suckers 
molded in the shape of a rooster.). 
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a man looking down at his privates.88 
A disparaging mark is one that brings dishonor by comparison with 
something inferior, or that deprecates, degrades, or injures by an unjust 
comparison.89  Unlike with scandalous marks, which are supposed to be 
evaluated with reference to a substantial composite of American society as a 
whole, disparagement more narrowly focuses on the views of the referenced 
group.90  Interestingly, there have been times, mostly in the distant past, when 
a mark could be scandalous even when only a particular group might find it 
offensive.91  For instance, an application for Senussi on cigarettes was deemed 
scandalous because it was the name for a Moslem sect whose followers forbade 
the use of cigarettes.92 This was despite the fact that a substantial composite of 
the public would not even recognize the word “Senussi” nor be offended by its 
use on cigarettes.  Today, the T.T.A.B. has made it clear that these cases 
reached the right conclusion, but should have been approached under the rubric 
for disparagement, since the focus was on the religious sensibilities of a 
particular group.  As a consequence, the meaning of disparagement has been 
broadened to include any circumstance in which registration “would offend the 
sensibilities of an ethnic or religious group,” even if it does not serve to make 
the members feel inferior.93  In addition, one can assume that those decision 
makers finding marks to be scandalous to religious orders would have reached 
the same conclusions today using the disparagement standards. 
The following two-part test is used to determine if a proposed mark should 
be denied registration or cancelled because it is disparaging: 
(1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into 
account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the 
matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or 
services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace 
in connection with the goods or services; and 
(2) If that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, 
beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging 
 
88. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d. 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding scandalous a mark comprised 
of a nude man and woman embracing in a manner appearing to expose male genitalia). 
89. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp.2d 96, 124 (D.D.C.  2003), 
90. Id. 
91. See Lynda J. Oswald, Challenging the Registration of Scandalous and Disparaging Marks 
Under the Lanham Act: Who Has Standing to Sue?, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 251, 269–70 (2004). 
92. In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 339 (TTAB 1959). 
93. See In re Lebanese Arak Corp. 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
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to a substantial composite of the referenced group.94 
The first part of the test can be equated to the contextual approach used to 
address whether a mark is scandalous.95  Thus, if a mark can have several 
meanings, then one needs to consider the context of how the mark is designed 
and used to resolve market perceptions.  For instance, the definition of a “dough 
boy” includes (1) a piece of bread that is rolled thin and fried in deep fat, and 
(2) an American infantryman in World War I.  Given this, the PTO refused to 
register the term for an anti-venereal prophylactic preparation because the 
packaging featured depictions of American soldiers, which made it pretty clear 
how the term would be interpreted.96  Likewise, when dealing with marks that 
include “Jesus,” one would have to decide if the word refers to Christ or rather 
another individual who happens to be named Jesus.  Although in almost all 
cases the reference will most likely pertain to Jesus Christ, the name 
nonetheless may take on a different meaning if the mark, for instance, were 
designed with a large Mexican sombrero.97 
Assuming the name refers to Christ, though, one then has to appraise 
whether the manner of its use on the products upon which it appears would be 
disparaging to a substantial number of Christians.  In addition, the mark must 
be disparaging at the time of registration.98  This requirement has been a thorn 
for those who have requested cancellation of the REDSKINS marks because 
adult plaintiffs may only have a certain amount of time after registration to 
bring suit, given that this is the time when their alleged injury first arose.99  It 
also means that a company that obtains a registration including the name of 
 
94. E.g., id.; In re Heeb Media L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008); see also Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp.2d 96, 125 (D.D.C.  2003), 
95. See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d  at 125 (stating that “the question of disparagement must be 
considered in relation to the goods or services identified by the mark in the context of the 
marketplace.”). 
96. Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. The Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 227 (C.C.P.A. 1951). The 
board determined that American soldiers would find their association with condoms and venereal 
disease to be disparaging. Id. 
97. See, e.g., In re In Over Our Heads Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, at *1 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (the 
design mark of Moonies on dolls refers to dropping trousers rather than members of the Unification 
Church (founded by Reverend Moon) because the design of the two o’s form the caricature of a naked 
buttocks). 
98. E.g., Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 125. 
99. The doctrine of laches may prevent opponents from bringing cancellation proceedings 
based on disparagement when a delay in filing unreasonably prejudices the registrant. See Pro-Football, 
Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005). But see Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 193-94 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (stating that a cancellation proceeding under section 1064(3) is not subject to any time limit). 
The laches defense, if available at all, only applies to undue delays after the petitioner reaches the age 
of majority. Harjo, 415 F.3d at 48. 
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Jesus could not lose that registration because of a change of morals or because 
of something the trademark owner later did with the product that was perceived 
as disparaging.100 
The key question, then, is under what circumstances can the use of “Jesus” 
on products be considered offensive.  At the outset, some Christians might 
believe that it is offensive to use the name of Jesus Christ to commercially 
market products at all.  This is not a totally unprecedented thought.101  For 
instance, William Henry Browne, an influential nineteenth century legal 
scholar indicated in his writings that registration of religious symbols would be 
improper regardless of the goods with which they are associated.102  Also, in 
one instance, the PTO rejected the registration of Agnus Dei (with a design) for 
metallic tabernacle safes because the PTO found it offensive to “commercialize 
an emblem of such highly sacred religious significance.”103  Nevertheless, the 
PTO and reviewing bodies have never since applied such a sweeping per se 
rule for religious symbols, rather, they have consistently evaluated them with a 
contextual approach that considers the nature of their association with the 
relevant goods and services.104 
There are several instances in which a reviewing body has upheld an 
examiner’s decision to deny registration of a religious term because the 
members of the relevant religion would find the relationship of the term with 
the product to be offensive.  As already mentioned, the PTO rejected 
registration for Sennusi on cigarettes because adherents of the Moslem sect 
forbid the use of cigarettes.105 Similarly, the PTO previously rejected Messias  
 
100. This is an odd result if the purpose of the statute is to somehow detach the force of federal 
authority from immoral acts.  If this were the case, one would assume that a targeted group should be 
able to challenge a disparaging mark at any time that the mark becomes disparaging, even if the offense 
first arises after registration.  This is not an unprecedented approach with the Lanham Act.  For 
instance, marks may be cancelled at any time if they become generic, even if the genericism occurs 
after registration. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006).  The same is true if marks become 
functional. Id. The current language of the Lanham Act does not allow disparaging marks to be treated 
in this way, however, because the registration can only be cancelled if it were obtained contrary to the 
provisions of section 102(a) (emphasis added). Id. 
101. See Abdel-Khalik, supra note 74, at 191 (stating that under the pre-1905 common law, 
“Congress intended the registration prohibition to protect any religion’s terms and images from use by 
trademark owners.”). 
102. Abdel-Khalik, supra note 74, at 194. 
103. Ex parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. 22 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1943). 
See Abdel-Khalik, supra note 74, at 203-204. 
104. See Abdel-Khalik, supra note 74, at 202-204; Cf. In re Lebanese Arak Corp. 94 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, at *9 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (stating that “we disagree with the suggestion by the dissent 
that the ground for disparagement is appropriate only if the mark per se is disparaging, without regard 
to the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.”). 
105. In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959). 
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for wine and brandy,106 Khoran for wine,107 and Madonna for wine.108  Based 
on this history, one can surmise that the PTO would reject applications for 
marks that associate Jesus with products that currently would offend Christians 
because they contradict the philosophy of Jesus.  Thus, the PTO would probably 
object to applications for marks referencing Jesus that are intended to be used 
on products, such as guns, birth control or sex toys, which Christians may find 
degrading.109 
The primary topic here, though, are Jesus-related marks for expressive 
products, such as t-shirts, hats, bumper stickers and mugs.  In these instances, 
Christians would not find the association of Jesus with the types of products to 
be offensive, as they may with guns or condoms.  Thus, in these instances, the 
mark must be disparaging in and of itself without an associated inference 
derived from the identified product.  To begin, the word “Jesus” by itself, 
cannot be disparaging on such products because there are no disparaging 
connotations of the singular word.  As such, it differs from Heeb, which the 
PTO rejected because it would be disparaging to a substantial composite of 
Jewish individuals, despite possible positive connotations accepted by younger 
members of the Jewish faith.110  However, companies can construct phrases 
including the word “Jesus,” which would be disparaging.  In this vein, the PTO 
recently rejected an application for Jesus Porno because it associates Jesus 
Christ with pornography, and according to the agency, Christians of all types 
believe that pornography is directly contrary to the teachings of Jesus.111  Also, 
 
106. In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comercial Dos Vinhos Miessias, S.A.R.L., 159 U.S.P.Q. 275 
(T.T.A.B. 1968). 
107. Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at *10. 
108. In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938)..  The PTO recently registered 
MADONNA for wine, demonstrating that there has been a change in moral attitudes since 1938. 
MADONNA, Registration No. 3545635.  As the Federal Circuit has stated about scandalous marks, 
[t]oday’s scandal can be tomorrow’s vogue.” In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 1994). 
109. The PTO apparently might not object to the association of Jesus with spirits since it 
granted a notice of allowance of “JESUS JUICE” for wine.  PTO, Notice of Allowance, U.S. Trademark 
Application. Serial No. 78360553 (filed Aug. 16, 2005).  The applicant abandoned the application on 
Dec. 15, 2005 after the PTO received a letter of protest from an evangelical minister. 
110. In re Heeb Media L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1071, at *5 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (affirming the 
PTO’s refusal to register Heeb for clothing and entertainment services). Previously, the PTO did 
register “HEEB” for magazines. HEEB, Registration No. 2858011.  Some observers have argued that 
the examiner made a mistake in this instance.  E.g., Jessica M. Kiser, How Dykes on Bikes Got it Right: 
Procedural Inequities Inherent in the Trademark Office’s Review of Disparaging Trademarks, 46 
U.S.F.L. Rev. 1, 17 (2011) (stating that “Heeb Media’s one registration was granted erroneously.”). 
111. Trademark App. Serial No. 85767380, Office Action (Mar. 7, 2013). The application was 
for DVDs and videos in the field of adult entertainment, but the opinion only notes that fact in a 
parenthetical, thus implying that the association of porno with Jesus might have been sufficiently 
disparaging, even if the mark were used with other kinds of goods.  Similarly, the PTO refused to 
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if a mark includes a design with Jesus, for instance shooting a pistol, then the 
PTO likely would find the overall mark to be disparaging to Christians.112  
Finally, the design of the mark might be problematic if it were positioned in an 
objectionable way.113  For example, if the application sought rights to position 
the word “Jesus” down the crotch of men’s jeans, Christians might perceive the 
association of Jesus with male genitalia as disparaging. 
Michael Anton objected to the registration of JESUS for jeans because 
Jesus Jeans S.R.L. marketed its clothes with sexual innuendo, contrary to moral 
positions reflected in the bible.114  Although marketing may be relevant to 
address whether the public understands that JESUS means Jesus Christ, it 
cannot be a factor in evaluating whether the mark, once determined to refer to 
Jesus, is disparaging.115  Rather, the PTO only can appraise the other elements 
of the mark, the associated products, and the manner in which the mark appears 
on those products.116  There are both practical and constitutional reasons for 
this conclusion.  As a practical matter, the PTO’s judgment about morality is a 
static decision that must be made at the time of registration, without regard to 
how the trademark owner may later or tangentially use the trademark to cause 
offense.117  For instance, the PTO registered HOOTERS with the design of an 
owl for restaurant services, despite the possible disparaging connotation of the 
word, because the design accentuated its innocuous meaning in the context of 
restaurants in general.118  The PTO is not then charged with policing the kinds 
of restaurant services the trademark owner might establish or the possibly 
disparaging ways the mark is used to market those services.  Obviously, 
trademark owners often change their business plans or sell their rights to others 
 
register Drunk for Jesus as a trademark for shirts due to disparagement. Trademark App. Serial No. 
85428786, Office Action (Jan. 23, 2012).  Some phrases may have a double-entendre, which are not 
disparaging in light of the goods to which the registration specifically applies.  An example would be 
HOOKERS FOR JESUS, which is registered for charitable services that organize women’s groups to 
undertake projects for the benefit of the homeless, among others.  HOOKERS FOR JESUS, 
Registration No. 3743882. The word “ hookers” in this context, means those who crochet. 
112. Cf., In re McGinley, 600 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding scandalous a mark for a 
sexually oriented newsletter that comprised a photograph of a nude man and woman kissing and 
embracing in a manner appearing to expose male genitalia.). 
113. One criterion for disparagement is “the manner in which the mark is used in the 
marketplace in connection with the goods or services.” See supra note 94, and accompanying text. 
114. Supra note 66 at 3–6. 
115. Cf. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp.2d 96, 126–27 (D.D.C.  2003),(Although the 
vast majority of media uses of the term Redskins referred to the Washington’s football club, it would 
be disingenuous to ignore the Native American imagery associated with the marks.). 
116. See supra note 94, and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 98–99, and accompanying text. 
118. HOOTERS, Registration No. 1320029. 
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with different intentions.119  Thus, the PTO can only conceivably consider the 
nature of the mark in the context of covered products with the evidence it has 
before it at the time of registration.  Addressing how the mark is, or may be, 
advertised clearly is outside the purview of what the PTO is authorized to do.120 
The PTO would also violate the First Amendment if it were to use 
trademark laws to punish companies that advertise in offensive ways.  
Admittedly, there is some controversy whether the PTO should even be able to 
deny registration on the grounds of disparagement since that might deter 
individuals from marking their products with statements that the government 
finds objectionable.121  At least, though, in this instance, the agency’s decisions 
are directly related to the core of its mission, which is to enhance market 
efficiency and ethics by granting exclusive rights to identification symbols.122  
For this reason, constitutional objections are typically overcome due to the 
importance of the government’s objective in relation to the impact on free 
speech.123  However, the government would clearly be overstepping its 
constitutional grounds if it were to use the potential loss of trademark 
registration as leverage to control statements that are not even part of the 
regulated trademark.124  Just imagine if the Federal Government threatened to 
cancel Comedy Central’s trademark because John Stewart made disparaging 
comments about Christianity on his show or perhaps closer to the point, if it 
 
119. Cf., In re Heeb Media L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1071, at n.5 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (The TTAB 
rebutted applicant’s argument that the audience for Heeb products understand the term in a non-
disparaging way by stating, “inasmuch as the identification of goods and services is not limited to 
clothing and entertainment services offered by Jews for Jews, this registration could be assigned to 
anyone, and these goods and services could be offered in all channels of trade to all classes of 
consumers.”). 
120. The plain meaning of the Lanham Act demands this result, since it provides that “[n]o 
trademark . . . shall be refused registration . . . on account of its nature unless it consists of . . . 
scandalous matter . . . or matter which may disparage. . . .” (emphasis added). Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(a) (2006).  Advertising for a product is distinct from the nature and composition of the 
trademark that is used with the product to identify source. 
121. See, e.g., Blankenship, supra note 79, at 438–443; Yu, supra note 75, at 129–30. 
122. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 564 (1980)  (a government restriction of commercial speech is constitutional only if it satisfies 
each condition of a three prong test: (1) the government must assert a substantial interest for the 
restriction; (2) the regulation on speech must advance that interest directly; and (3) the regulation must 
be no broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.). 
123. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, The First Amendment as a Check on Copyright Rights, 23 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 587, 591-92 (2001). Cf. In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 
1367,1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (The prohibition on registering scandalous marks does not violate the 
First Amendment because a refusal to register does not affect the right to use a mark nor suppress any 
tangible form of expression.); Holiday Inn v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 534 F.2d 312, 319 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 
1976). 
124. A government regulation on commercial speech must directly further the government 
interest in protecting trademarks. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
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targeted Madonna’s trademark after she sang a disparaging song on stage.125  
Really, this is no different than what Michael Anton asked the PTO to do with 
Jesus Jeans S.R.L.’s trademark for JESUS. Obviously, in each of these 
situations, the disconnection between the governmental purpose and the 
restriction on speech makes the cancellation an unconstitutional interference 
with the First Amendment.126 
Based on this analysis, Michael Anton’s argument that JESUS is a 
disparaging trademark due to the advertising of the product does not hold water.  
This does not mean that there are not ways to use “Jesus” in a trademark that 
would be scandalous or disparaging.  Nonetheless, most applicants who seek 
trademarks that name “Jesus” on expressive products typically want to say 
laudatory things about him. Indeed, what they desire is not something that 
disparages Jesus Christ, but rather sole rights to say something that glorifies 
him. Michael Anton’s application for Jesus Surfed is a case in point.  
Unfortunately, it is with these applications that the PTO has been making its 
biggest mistake, by perfunctorily assuming that Jesus-related statements 
automatically serve the requisite trademark functions on expressive products. 
III. WHAT DO YOU MEAN I CAN’T SAY THAT ABOUT JESUS? 
The purveyors of expressive products typically attach some importance to 
the physical attributes of their wares, such as the quality of materials, fit, and 
appearance.  However, without question, they also care very much about the 
statements displayed on their products.  In fact, consumers often are primarily 
attracted to these products because they want to publicly communicate 
something that is important to them, whether it’s a three-peat championship 
win, that Jesus Rules, or that they really like Apple products. Thus, companies 
selling expressive products may pretend that their trademarks are all about the 
tags or the inconspicuous identification labels, but the reality is that they want 
exclusive rights to prominently display particular statements so that they can 
increase the appeal of their products.  For this reason, one really cannot talk 
about trademark rights for these kinds of expressive products without 
appraising how those rights will affect others who may want to compete by 
prominently conveying the same messages on their merchandise. 
A. Are Statements about Jesus on Expressive Products Functional? 
Since expressive products are intended to provide information about the 
owner’s interests, feelings, or personalities, the statements they make are 
 
125. COMEDY CENTRAL, Registration No. 1745015 (for television broadcasting services).; 
MADONNA, Registration No. 1473554 (for entertainment services). 
126. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
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integral to each product’s overall concept or function.  For this reason, slogans 
and other comparable forms of communication should be treated for trademark 
purposes just like any other important features of product design.  For obvious 
reasons, this includes slogans that refer to Jesus, including shorthand statements 
that symbolize a larger phrase or idea.  Thus, even one word references, such 
as “LiveJesus,” are meant to communicate particular sentiments, whether they 
are positive, negative or simply in jest.127 
Although trademarks were once limited to technical words and images that 
were attached to products, they now extend to trade dress, which encompasses 
attributes such as packaging, odor, sound, color, and product design.128  
Protection of product designs, in particular, raise special trademark concerns 
on two fronts (1) the potential for inappropriate effects on competition129 and 
(2) the high probability that the design does not initially serve an identification 
function.130 
The first issue regarding competition is addressed with a doctrine called 
functionality.131  The root of functionality is to ensure that trademarks do not 
interfere with patent policies by protecting unpatented product features that the 
patent laws say should be free for all to use.132  Thus, based on the notion of 
functionality, trademarks do not protect important utilitarian features of an 
article.133  Patents also are devised to provide the appropriate incentives needed 
 
127. LIVEJESUS, Registration No. 85694686 (Jan. 22, 2013), for specified clothing, including 
t-shirts, hats, sweatshirts and beanies, and jewelry items. 
128. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (The 
breadth of the elements actionable under the Lanham Act “has been held to embrace not just word 
marks or symbol marks, but also ‘trade dress’ – a category that originally included only the packaging, 
or ‘dressing’ of a product, but in recent years has been expanded by many courts of appeals to 
encompass the product’s design.”). See In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (scent of 
plumeria blossoms on sewing thread may serve as trademark); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 
Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (Product color may serve as a trademark); In re General Electric 
Broadcasting Co. Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (NBC three-tone chimes may serve as 
trademark). 
129. See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165; W. T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339–
40 (7th Cir. 1985). 
130. See e.g., Samara, 529 U.S. at 212–13. 
131. According to the Supreme Court, a product attribute is functional and cannot serve as a 
trademark “if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
article.”). Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10 (1982) 
132. See, e.g., Burgunder, supra note 16, at 725; Kerry S. Taylor, Note, TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205, 214–17. See also Traffix Devices, Inc. v. 
Mkg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers 
for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period 
of exclusivity.”). 
133. Traffix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 32–33. 
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to create useful and attractive product features.134  To this end, the functionality 
doctrine also prevents trademarks from unduly conferring market benefits, by, 
for instance, protecting useful or aesthetically appealing product attributes that 
other companies need to reasonably compete.135  The Lanham Act makes it 
abundantly clear that functionality trumps all other considerations no matter the 
time or circumstances, by, among other things, preventing registration of 
functional features136 and allowing for them to be cancelled at any time.137 
When addressing expressive products that include references to Jesus, the 
focus of functionality is whether trademark protection would cause competitors 
to suffer “a significant non-reputation related disadvantage.”138 In this regard, 
courts have sometimes ruled that an aesthetic design is functional when it serves 
as an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.139  For 
instance, the floral design on a plate was deemed functional because customers 
primarily chose the plate so that they could display the china pattern.140  
Likewise, one might argue that prominent statements about Jesus on expressive 
products are functional because customers primarily purchase the products to 
 
134. The U.S. economic system is based on the notion that free markets promote public welfare. 
See, e.g., Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943).  However, 
inventors and product designers may forego creative activities if others are free to take their ideas as 
soon as the creators disclose them to the public. See Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From 
Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 878 (1971). Patents, as well as copyrights, are intended to 
address the economic disincentives resulting from free competition, by giving inventors and artists a 
limited period of exclusive use to that they have an opportunity to profit from their creativity. E.g., 
Burgunder, supra note 20, at 267. See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
146 (1988). 
135. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (stating that if a 
product design’s value lies in its ability to confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be 
duplicated by the use of alternative designs, then the design is functional). 
136. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006). 
137. Id. at § 1064(3).  The Act also requires a person suing for infringement of a trade dress to 
prove that the material is not functional. Id. at § 1125(a)(3). 
138. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mkg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). The Supreme Court 
provided that this is the sole measure of functionality for aesthetic (as opposed to utilitarian) product 
features. Statements on expressive products about Jesus (or anything else, for that matter) can only be 
functional in aesthetic terms since they don’t affect utilitarian qualities, such as the fit or durability, of 
the merchandise. See, Burgunder, supra note 9, at 791. 
139. E.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343–34 (9th Cir. 1952); (concluding 
that floral design of china pattern was aesthetically because it was an important reason in its 
commercial success); Industria Arredmenti Fratel-Li Saporti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 20 
(2d Cir. 1984) (The design of an Italian sofa was aesthetically functional because it enhanced 
saleability); Damn I’m Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F.Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (The phrase, 
Damn I’m Good, did not identify source and was functional because it was an important ingredient in 
the products’ commercial success). 
140. Pagliero, 198 F.2d 339. 
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display the sentiments.141  Following this logic, most prominent Jesus-based 
statements could never serve as trademarks on expressive products, even if 
customers understood them to represent source.142  Having said this, the 
important ingredient test for functionality has had a checkered past, and most 
courts have rejected or questioned its application.143  For this reason, this article 
does not advocate applying the draconian approach here.  However, perhaps it 
should serve as a warning to be more cautious before granting trademark rights 
to Jesus-related statements on expressive products. 
An aesthetic attribute would also be deemed functional if the feature is more 
desirable or provides greater market power than other designs that competitors 
might conceivably use with their products.144  So, if “Jesus 4 Me” were one of 
only a very few excellent ways to express a love for Jesus, then it might be 
unfair to give companies rights to those few possibilities.  However, the result 
seems unlikely since there are an enormous number of expressions that people 
might create that are equally effective in articulating this emotion.  Thus, the 
functionality doctrine should not serve as an absolute bar to obtaining 
trademark rights in expressions involving Jesus.  Having said this, a 
functionality issue may be more credible when the issue is about protecting the 
sole word “Jesus.”  Despite the theoretical basis for the dilution doctrine, Jesus 
S.R.L., the owner of JESUS, has a credible threat against anyone wanting to 
consistently make a Jesus-related statement on an expressive product, on the 
grounds that the appropriation of its entire mark causes a likelihood of 
confusion.145  Since the trademark owners of other Jesus-related phrases cannot 
so widely make this claim, Jesus S.R.L. has a relative competitive advantage 
 
141. See, Burgunder, supra note 9, at 792. 
142. The notable exception would be if the Jesus-related statement had become well known in 
another context to represent source.  Although customers might purchase the shirt because they wanted 
to display the slogan, the attraction results from the reputation previously developed by the 
organization through its other activities identified with the slogan.  For this reason, the statement is not 
functional on the expressive products because the demand is not created by a non-reputation related 
attribute, as required by the Supreme Court in Traffix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 33. Cf. Au-Tomotive 
Gold, Inc., v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006) (ruling that 
application of “Audi” on key chains was not functional because the demand derived from the goodwill 
of the automaker’s trademark.). 
143. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).  For a 
history of aesthetic functionality and problems related to the” important ingredient” test, see Christian 
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc. 696 F.3d 206, 219–22 (2d Cir. 2012); Au-
Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1067–72. 
144. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995); Louboutin, 
696 F.3d at 221–22; W. T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339–40 (7th Cir. 1985). 
145. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (stating that 
consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the aesthetic purposes 
that product design serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants.). 
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simply by virtue of its exclusive rights to JESUS.  Nevertheless, the 
functionality doctrine may be a slightly awkward way to address the problem, 
and as we shall see, genericism may be the better approach.146  In any event, 
the bottom line is that a trademark should never provide a competitive 
advantage unrelated to its owner’s goodwill, and so, at the end of the day, one 
of the doctrines should prevent the result.147 
B. Can Statements about Jesus on Expressive Products Be Distinctive? 
Trademarks are identification symbols that are attached to products in order 
to represent source.  As the range of features serving as trademarks has 
expanded to attributes such as product designs, the concept of attachment has 
moved from the physical to the conceptual.  Thus, a viewer who sees the phrase 
“Jesus Freak” on a t-shirt must at least be able to conceptually separate the 
statement from the overall shirt design and then use it to identify the source of 
the product.148  Recently, the Supreme Court determined that customers would 
almost never, at first, automatically make that conceptual leap, but that over 
time they might make the connection, especially if the seller takes steps, 
through advertising or other actions to highlight the attribute’s trademark 
significance.149  In other words, when the shirt is originally sold, customers will 
believe that “Jesus Freak” is simply an expression on the shirt, but over time 
they may understand that it primarily serves to identify source.150  For this 
reason, the t-shirt seller has no right to prevent others from prominently 
displaying “Jesus Freak” on their shirts until that seller can demonstrate that the 
phrase has attained secondary meaning.151 
 
146. See infra notes 166–169, and accompanying text. 
147. Ownership in the JESUS mark clearly establishes competitive advantages with expressive 
products, since the word is so important to consumer demand.  The same issues might also arise with 
other products, let’s say a refrigerator, if consumers would prefer a refrigerator that displays the name 
of Jesus to an identical refrigerator that says something else, such as Whirlpool.  This issue is outside 
the purview of this article, but one that could be easily tested by marketing professionals. 
148. See Samara, 529 U.S. at 212; Duraco Prod., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 
1449–50 (3d Cir. 1994). JESUS FREAK is a registered trademark for clothing, including t-shirts, 
sweatshirts, caps and hats, among other items.  JESUS FREAK, Registration. No. 3118307. 
149. Samara, 529 U.S. at 212, 216. 
150. According to the Supreme Court, product designs are not “inherently distinctive,” as 
suggestive or fanciful trademarks are, and so should not be accorded trademark rights until the 
applicant proves that they have acquired source-identification functions. Id. at 211–12. 
151. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000). Secondary meaning 
can be proven by a non-exclusive list of factors, including: the extent of sales and advertising leading 
to buyer association; length of use; exclusivity of use; the fact of copying; customer surveys; customer 
testimony; the use of the mark in trade journals; the size of the company; the number of sales; the 
number of customers; and actual confusion. See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 
277, 292 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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The only exception to the secondary meaning requirement is if “Jesus 
Freak” had already become famous for representing an organization or product 
in another context.  In that event, the phrase already has attained a form of 
secondary meaning, since viewers recognize it as representing the alternate 
source.152  The Lanham Act provides for such immediate protection through 
what are called sponsorship rights and they apply with equal force to Jesus-
related marks.153  For this reason, a clothing manufacturer might need to get 
permission before applying “Jews for Jesus” on its wares because the phrase is 
already a well-known trademark for a non-profit organization.154 
Although a product design is too integral to the product to serve 
immediately as a trademark, product packaging is different, because it is simply 
the veneer that covers the basic product.  For this reason, packaging is 
somewhat like a mark that is placed on a separate product, meaning that if it is 
inherently distinctive, then it can immediately identify source.155  So, it should 
be clear that when the phrase “Jesus Freak” appears on an expressive product, 
it does not serve as a trademark because it merely advances the product’s 
primary purpose of informing others about one’s intense devotion to Jesus. 
However, if the standard phrase is written in a very distinctive way, then the 
design elements that, in a sense, envelope the phrase may represent source just 
like inherently distinctive packaging.  For this reason, a clothing manufacturer 
should be able to gain immediate registration for a distinctive stylized design 
of “Jesus Freak,” but with a clear disclaimer that its trademark protection of the 
overall design does not cover use of the phrase itself.156  This would mean that 
competitors could not copy the distinctive style elements that have trademark 
 
152. The PTO recognizes this in TMEP §1202.03. (“Ornamental matter that serves as an 
identifier of a ‘secondary source’ is registrable on the principle register.  For example, ornamental 
matter on a t-shirt (e.g., the designation ‘NEW YORK UNIVERSITY’) can convey to the purchasing 
public the ‘secondary source’ of the t-shirt (rather than the manufacturing source).”). 
153. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Due to sponsorship rights, Nike might have the 
right to prevent other companies from stating “Just Do It” on their expressive products, since customers 
will associate the slogan with Nike and likely believe that the company authorized its use with the 
product.  See, e.g., Burgunder, supra note 9, at 784; Irene Caboli, The Case for a Limited Protection 
of Trademark Merchandising, 11 U. ILL. L. REV., 865, 880–86 (2011); Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82:5 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1911–12 (2007). 
154. JEWS FOR JESUS, Registration No. 1252889, (design mark for religious pamphlets); 
JEWS FOR JESUS, Registration No. 3226873, (standard character mark for religious services). 
155. E.g., Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (restaurant décor may be 
inherently distinctive).  See Samara, 529 U.S. at 214–15 (explaining that restaurant décor may be 
inherently distinctive because it is more like packaging than a product design.). 
156. See TMEP §1213 (on disclaimer of Elements in Marks). The PTO explains that a 
disclaimer of a component of a composite mark means that no rights are being asserted in the 
disclaimed component standing alone, and that the registration represents only such rights that flow 
from use of the composite mark. Id.  See Sprague Electric Co. v. Erie Resistor Corp., 101 U.S.P.Q. 
486, 486–87 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1954). 
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significance, for that would surely confuse customers about source, but those 
manufacturers still would be able to relay the essential message about being a 
Jesus Freak. Of course, if over time, the phrase “Jesus Freak” attained 
secondary meaning by identifying the source of the original manufacturer, then 
that seller could gain exclusive rights to the phrase as well.157 
C. Does the First Amendment Trump Trademarks for Statements about Jesus? 
Freedom of speech is a treasured right in the United States, and the 
government must have important or compelling reasons to impose limitations 
on the expression of ideas.158  For instance, the Copyright Act prevents 
duplication of original expressions to satisfy the important objective of 
motivating creative works.159  Copyrights do not protect short statements, 
though, because they do not require sufficient creative effort to merit 
interference with the First Amendment.160  The government, of course, has 
passed a law that governs short phrases and symbols through trademarks, but 
for the very different reason to prevent consumer confusion.  Thus, one always 
must be mindful that trademarks are not intended to provide incentives to create 
clever slogans; rather the goal is to facilitate source identification.  So, a 
statement may be really imaginative, but that is not a reason to limit others from 
duplicating it via trademarks.  Instead, one needs to make sure that the phrase 
really is understood as a designation of source.  When considering statements 
about Jesus on expressive products, this is best accomplished by requiring proof 
of secondary meaning.161 
Even when trademark protection is appropriate, the Lanham Act takes pains 
to make sure that free speech rights are not implicated.162  For instance, artists 
 
157. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(b) (2006). (No disclaimer shall affect the registrant’s right 
to register the disclaimed matter if that matter has become distinctive of the goods or services); TMEP 
§ 1213.11 (Acquiring Rights in Disclaimed Matter). See Quaker Oil Corp. v. Quaker State Oil Ref. 
Corp., 161 U.S.P.Q. 547, 549–50 (T.T.A.B. 1969), aff’d, 453 F.2d 1296 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
158. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964); Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 450 (2d Cir. 2001). 
159. See, e.g., Feist Pub’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991); 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
160. See U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 34, Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, 
Titles or Short Phrases. See also Feist, 499 U.S. at 359 (“There remains a narrow category of works 
in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or is so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. Such works 
are incapable of sustaining valid copyright.”). 
161. See, Burgunder, supra note 9, at 797–98. 
162. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 (1993); 
Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful 
Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 979–81 (2007); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border 
Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 
80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 899–922 (2005). 
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who integrate trademarks into works involving parody usually do not infringe 
due to judicious applications of the likelihood of confusion analysis.163  Other 
times, those using trademarks are relieved of liability when they add sufficient 
transformational content.164  What is most important for the discussion here is 
that these approaches typically do not provide sanctuary to those who merely 
duplicate a trademark and use it on related or competitive products.165  This 
means that if a company owns a trademark for “Jesus Freak” when used with 
clothing, then it will have a credible claim against a competitor who might 
prominently display it on its merchandise.166  This is despite the fact that the 
phrase might not identify source in this context and so should be free under the 
First Amendment for anyone to say.  For this reason, the PTO needs to be very 
careful before granting trademark rights to statements on expressive products, 
because the result may be an unwarranted chill on the freedom of speech. 
IV. SWEET JESUS, IT’S JUST A TRICK! 
When evaluating the propriety of trademark registration for expressive 
products, the PTO makes the same mistake with Jesus-related phrases as it 
makes more generally with slogans; it fails to recognize that the applicant’s 
purpose is most typically to control prominent displays of the phrase rather than 
to facilitate source-identification.167  Since the PTO doesn’t recognize how the 
objectives differ with expressive products, it evaluates registration using the 
same principles as it does for other kinds of merchandise.  However, it makes 
two stunning errors by ignoring the marketing realities. 
As previously noted, the PTO must consider whether an applicant’s mark 
can serve a distinct identification function for the product.168  To this end, the 
PTO should never register generic words or phrases, and it should wait to 
register descriptive terms until the applicant can demonstrate secondary 
meaning.  Regarding the application for JESUS, when used with wearing 
apparel, the PTO apparently assumes that Jesus is distinctive because it is 
unrelated to the function of clothing.  However, given the special circumstances 
with expressive products, the PTO has improperly defined the relevant product 
 
163. See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007–10 (9th Cir. 2001); Louis 
Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006); Bally Total 
Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
164. See, e.g., Comedy III Prod. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) 
165. See id. at 811. 
166. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000) (stating that 
legitimate uses may be deterred not only by successful suit, but by the plausible threat of successful 
suit.). 
167. See, Burgunder, supra note 9, at 782. 
168. See supra notes 15–27, and accompanying text. 
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market.169  With expressive products, the applicant is not merely interested in 
placing an identification tag or symbol with the product; rather the goal is to 
prominently emblazon the merchandise with the statement.  So, when 
considering statements about Jesus, market realities suggest that the product 
definition is not simply t-shirts or mugs, but instead is something much more 
limited, such as “products that comment on Jesus” or, for short, “Jesus 
merchandise.”  So, the question is whether the singular word “Jesus” is a 
generic description for the entire class of Jesus merchandise.  If the answer does 
not seem completely obvious, think about whether a mountain bike company 
should have sole rights to the word, “mountain.”  In other words, its products 
would be “mountain” mountain bikes.  The absurdity of this notion is no 
different than allowing a company to have sole rights to JESUS Jesus 
merchandise.  Since the word “Jesus” is the one unifying element across the 
entire product class, it cannot be viewed as anything but generic for that class.170  
Thus, the PTO was correct in perceiving that the word, Jesus, is very weak due 
to extensive use.  Where it went astray was in thinking that it could have any 
trademark significance at all when associated with expressive products bearing 
that name.  Thus, the PTO erred when it granted a registration for the singular 
word “Jesus” for various types of expressive products.171 
Although the generic word “Jesus” cannot be claimed by itself as a 
trademark, it might be distinctive when combined with other words.  For this 
reason, a phrase such as “Jesus Surfed” is not the generic designation for all 
Jesus merchandise, and so is capable of designating source.  However, it 
 
169. For a discussion of the importance of appropriately defining the product class before 
making judgments about the competitive effects from trademark protection, see Burgunder, supra note 
16, at 729–30. 
170. Cf. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)  
(equating “common descriptive names” with generic terms.). In the same way, cotton is not a generic 
word for a shirt, it would be inappropriate to register the word as a standard character mark for cotton 
shirts because it is a common descriptive term for that specific kind of shirt. Cotton is registered for 
various products, including garments, but as a design mark that specifically disclaims the word 
“cotton” apart from the design. COTTON, Registration No. 1255361. 
171. Jeans are not necessarily expressive products to the same degree as t-shirts and hats.  Thus, 
one might argue that jeans are not Jesus merchandise as defined here and that the PTO should not 
prevent registration of JESUS for jeans on the grounds of genericism.  Nonetheless, since jeans are in 
the same class as t-shirts and hats, by virtue of being clothing, the registration would still allow the 
trademark owner to raise credible claims of infringement against those using “Jesus” on Jesus 
merchandise.  To prove the point, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. claimed that the use of “Jesus Surfed” on hats 
infringed its JESUS trademark, even though Jesus Jeans S.R.L. deleted hats and caps from its 
registration on Oct. 5, 2012. Notice of Opposition at 2–3,Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton, (T.T.A.B. Feb. 
20, 2013) available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=1 (claiming 
that the applicant for Jesus Surfed was attempting to register the name for related goods in the same 
channels of trade). In any event, the registration still covers other clothing products besides jeans, 
including t-shirts. 
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certainly is not inherently distinctive for its product class. Rather it should be 
viewed as descriptive for Jesus merchandise that prominently conveys a 
particular emotional sentiment – here peaceful reflection.  Thus, the term 
should be registered as a standard character mark only after the company can 
prove that “Jesus Surfed” has acquired secondary meaning beyond a 
description of reflective Jesus merchandise.  This, of course, is a good solution, 
because it mirrors what the company also must do to obtain exclusive rights to 
prominent displays of the phrase on its merchandise.  As with prominent 
displays, it is equally true here that the company could immediately register a 
distinctive stylized version or design that includes the phrase, because the 
artistry would render the entire image to be suggestive or arbitrary.172  In this 
event, the registration would not prevent others from using the unadorned 
descriptive phrase, at least until it attains secondary meaning. 
The other mistake that the PTO makes is perhaps the more egregious.  In 
order for a word to represent source, consumers must recognize that the word 
is being used as a trademark.  The PTO acknowledges that prominent words on 
expressive products do not immediately convey a trademark function.173  That 
is why proof of secondary meaning is required in this context.174  However, the 
PTO will immediately register the term if the specimen shows a small discrete 
use or if it is displayed on a tag or label.175  Even if one takes the position that 
“Jesus Surfed” is not technically descriptive for expressive merchandise, 
registration would still render the wrong result. 
The PTO needs to recognize that the submission of a tag or label as a 
specimen has simply become a trick to dupe examiners into allowing the 
registration.  Clearly, the applicant wants the registration so that it can have 
exclusive rights to display “Jesus Surfed” prominently on t-shirts, hats, 
sweatshirts and bandanas.  In theory, a registration would only give it exclusive 
rights to include hang tags or discrete labels with its wares, but there is no doubt 
that Anton would oppose any other company that used the phrase on competing 
products.  The litigious posture of the Jesus®-brand clothing company bears 
this out.  In theory, those companies that prominently display Jesus Surfed 
would not violate any rights, at least until the phrase had attained secondary 
meaning.  But what would you do if a trademark owner showed you a 
registration for the exact same phrase covering the same products that you are 
 
172. See supra note 5. 
173. TMEP §1202.03)f)(1). 
174. TMEP §1202.03(1). 
175. TMEP §1202.03(a) (stating that “[a] small, neat and discrete word or design feature . . . 
may be likely to create the commercial impression of a trademark.”); TMEP §904.04 (Material 
Appropriate as Specimens for Trademarks, including labels and tags). 
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selling?176  Based on typical likelihood of confusion principles, you probably 
would think it best to simply give up rather than fight a contest that you actually 
should win.177  Thus the result is that the registration has served no useful 
function besides deterring legitimate speech. 
Solving the problem is simple.  An applicant who wants trademark rights 
for a Jesus-related phrase as a standard character mark on expressive products 
must prove secondary meaning before obtaining registration.  In light of the 
Abercrombie distinctiveness spectrum for standard character terms, this is 
probably the correct outcome.  But beyond that, it prevents the obvious chilling 
effect that registration will invariably have on those wanting to make prominent 
uses of the same term. 
CONCLUSION 
The PTO’s willingness to register JESUS for expressive products and the 
resultant controversies and complaints illustrate that this topic merits greater 
attention and clarity.  The public obviously needs to better understand when a 
registration might be disparaging, and whether offensive advertising or use of 
a trademark should be grounds for opposition or cancellation.  Perhaps of 
greater importance, the PTO must reconsider its policies about registering 
Jesus-related trademarks for expressive products so that they are more 
consistent with the goals of the trademark system.  Although it may be 
appropriate for the PTO to immediately register designs that reference Jesus, 
the agency should deny the registrations for standard character marks until the 
applicant demonstrates secondary meaning. 
 
 
176. See, e.g., AMF Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979). (explaining 
that with competing goods, likelihood of confusion is determined by comparing the similarity of the 
marks.). 
177. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (finding that a 
blanket rule requiring proof of secondary meaning for protection of product designs is justified because 
of plausible threats of a lawsuit). 
